Will Latvia's grain transit fee triple prices in Germany and France? What the measure actually changes

Will Latvia's grain transit fee triple prices in Germany and France? What the measure actually changes

Publication date: 12 October 2026

Claim

A Belarusian media project claimed that Latvia's recommended 300% increase in charges for transporting grain from Russia and Belarus would make grain three times more expensive for buyers in Germany and France.

Verdict

False and misleading. The Latvian measure concerns a railway infrastructure charge for grain transit, including cargo sent through Latvian ports to third countries. It is not a 300% tax on all grain sold in France and Germany. The specific charge was to be determined by the independent operator LatRailNet under economic justification and regulatory oversight. Grain from Russia and Belarus also represents a very small share of EU cereal imports. The checked sources provide no basis for forecasting a threefold increase in prices for European buyers.

In brief

• The Latvian government recommended raising the infrastructure charge for Russian grain transit, but LatRailNet was to set the specific fee.
• The measure concerns use of Latvian railway infrastructure, not the wholesale or retail price of all grain in the EU.
• A substantial part of the discussed flow travels through Latvian ports to third countries, rather than to buyers in France and Germany.
• European Commission data show total EU cereal imports worth about EUR 8.7 billion in 2025. Cereal imports from Russia were worth about EUR 11 million, while the Belarus figure rounded to zero million euros in the table.
• Raising one transport component by 300% does not automatically raise the final price of a product by 300%.

Why it matters

The claim mixes three different quantities: an infrastructure charge in one country, the transport cost of a particular shipment, and the final price of grain on the European market. This substitution turns a limited transport measure into a prediction of a Europe-wide price shock.

Buyers, farmers and transport companies have legitimate reasons to discuss route changes, costs for Latvian firms and the effect on ports. Those consequences cannot be estimated by simply multiplying the final grain price by the recommended increase in one charge.

How we checked

We reviewed the original claim and the Belarusian Investigative Center's fact-check, reports by Latvia's public broadcaster LSM on the adopted procedure and actual transit, and European Commission trade statistics for 2025. We also checked the distinction between imports into the EU and transit through EU territory to third countries.

To assess scale, we compared the value of all EU cereal imports with imports from Russia and Belarus in the same European Commission statistical system. Those figures describe imports, not all physical transit, so we do not use them to estimate Latvian port revenue or cargo shipped outside the EU.

Evidence

LSM reported on 17 September that the Latvian parliament supported an accelerated procedure for reviewing charges on Russian grain transit. The government recommended increasing the current infrastructure charge by 300%, but LatRailNet was tasked with deciding the specific amount. The operator had to consider consultation, economic justification and independent regulatory supervision. That is different from imposing a 300% tax on grain purchased by French or German buyers.

The same report explains that the special procedure concerns transport from dispatch stations in Russia, including cargo sent to Latvian ports for onward export. A complete ban on transit of grain from Russia and Belarus was discussed separately as another proposal.

On 29 September, LSM reported that more than 253,000 tonnes of grain from Russia and more than 40,000 tonnes from Belarus had transited Latvia between 1 and 24 September. The new charge was not yet being applied at that point. These figures confirm a large transit flow, but they do not show that Germany and France are buying that grain.

The European Commission reports that total EU cereal imports were worth about EUR 8.7 billion in 2025. Its Russia factsheet lists EUR 11 million in cereal imports for the same year. The corresponding Belarus figure rounds to zero million euros in the Commission's table. Russia's share was therefore about 0.13% of total EU cereal import value, while the combined Russian and Belarusian share remained very small.

There is also a basic arithmetic problem. If a transport fee forms only part of the final price, increasing that fee does not automatically multiply the entire product price. The outcome depends on the transport share of total cost, route, contract terms, alternative ports, market supply and which party bears the additional charge.

When the Council of the EU adopted separate higher import tariffs on Russian and Belarusian grain in 2024, it explicitly distinguished imports into the EU from transit through the EU to third countries. The same distinction matters here: cargo in transit does not become a delivery to Germany or France merely because it crosses an EU member state's territory.

What remains unknown

Open sources do not show in advance how much of any additional charge carriers would pass on to shippers or buyers. It is also unknown how much cargo would be redirected through other ports or how contracts would change after a new fee took effect.

Grain prices depend on harvests, global supply, quality, freight, insurance, exchange rates and trade policy. Latvia's measure may affect individual routes and companies, but there is no verified evidence for a threefold price rise in France and Germany.

Conclusion

The claim that grain prices in Germany and France will triple is false. Latvia discussed a higher charge for a specific transit route, not a tax on the whole European grain market. The specific fee required a separate calculation, much of the cargo was intended for onward export, and Russia and Belarus supplied only a small share of EU cereal imports. An increase in one transport component cannot be transferred one for one to the final product price.

Sources

1. Belarusian Investigative Center, original claim and fact-check: https://investigatebel.org/en/fakenews/latvia-grain-transit-duty-eu-prices 2. LSM, Saeima decision and procedure for setting the infrastructure charge, 17 September 2026: https://eng.lsm.lv/article/economy/transport/17.09.2026-fees-to-be-hiked-on-russian-grain-transit-total-ban-to-be-considered.a663670 3. LSM, transit data for 1 to 24 September 2026: https://eng.lsm.lv/article/economy/transport/29.09.2026-big-growth-in-aggressor-state-grain-transit-via-latvia.a665366 4. European Commission, Monitoring EU Agri-Food Trade, 2025 data: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/document/download/94f6ec51-bae0-4807-bb48-828f38a46717_en?filename=monitoring-agri-food-trade_feb2026_en.pdf 5. European Commission, EU-Russia agri-food trade factsheet for 2025: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-05/agrifood-russia_en.pdf 6. European Commission, EU-Belarus agri-food trade factsheet for 2025: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-05/agrifood-belarus_en.pdf 7. Council of the EU, distinction between import tariffs and grain transit to third countries: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/30/council-sets-higher-tariffs-on-russian-and-belarusian-grain-products

Corrections

If LatRailNet, the Latvian government or EU institutions publish final comparable data on the charge and its price effects, we will update this article. Material corrections will be listed in this section.